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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rarely has a court’s opinion, even one from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, so altered existing notions of constitutional criminal procedure 
law as did the opinion in Terry v. Ohio.1  On several levels, the opinion dramat-
ically shifted the way in which the Fourth Amendment was understood.  Law 
students who had learned about the probable cause “requirement” and the war-
rant “requirement” were surprised to learn, especially in the case of the former, 
that these “requirements” were not required at all.2  To continue to conceptual-
ize the Fourth Amendment’s single sentence guarantees as consisting of a “war-
rant clause” and a “reasonableness” clause in which “unreasonable” meant 
“lacking probable cause,” was inconsistent with the Court’s exposition in 
Terry.3  These “requirements” apparently were to be viewed as desirable, but 
 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of International Legal Programs, St. Mary’s University School of 
Law.  My research for this article was aided greatly by the assistance of Elizabeth Resendez, Sarah 
Bassler, and Jesus Joslin. 
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. 
L. REV. 407, 418 (2006) (“In terms of regulating police conduct on the streets of America, Terry v. 
Ohio is probably the most important Supreme Court decision in modern criminal procedure.”). 
2. It should be noted that the Court referred to the probable cause “requirement” and character-
ized it as “fully relevant” at the same time it was creating a lower, but also acceptable, standard of 
suspicion.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
3. See id. at 20–21. 
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not essential, elements of a constitutional search or seizure.4  According to the 
Court, the Fourth Amendment only requires that the search and seizure be rea-
sonable; it does not require probable cause.5  A warrant is still preferred, but 
exceptions—narrowly-drawn exceptions6—excuse prior judicial approval. 
This seismic shift in the fundamental understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment was not the only transformative message of Terry, though.  When it ap-
plied the new reasonableness standard to the facts of the case, the Court popu-
lated its new universe with specific applications and a new standard of 
suspicion.7  The world created by the Court was no longer defined only by 
“search” or “no-search” and “arrest” or “no-arrest.”  Instead, there now existed 
what an advertising team might market as “Search Lite” and “Arrest Lite.”  An 
intermediate stage between the extremes of the pre-Terry paradigm, these way-
points still fell within the “search and seizure” language of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but did not involve the level of intrusion of their respective predecessors, 
custodial arrest and full-blown search.8  The seizure component (“Arrest 
Lite”),9 while within the protections of the Fourth Amendment, was less intru-
sive than the usual handcuffs-transportation to jail-booking arrest.  Lacking a 
more creative and less cumbersome description of this temporary seizure, the 
 
4. See id. at 24. 
5. See id. at 27, 30–31.  This transformation was made over the strong objection of Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas, who warned that “[t]he infringement on personal liberty of any ‘seizure’ of a person 
can only be ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess ‘probable 
cause’ before they seize him.”  Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  The Justice feared that diminishing 
the role of probable cause would “take a long step down the totalitarian path.”  Id. 
6. In light of the numerous cases interpreting the scope of these exceptions, describing them as 
“narrow” must now be seen as aspirational rather than descriptive.  See Russell L. Weaver, Investiga-
tion and Discretion: The Terry Revolution at Forty (Almost), 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1205, 1206–09 
(2005).  
7. See id. at 1208.  
8. The Court wrote: 
The distinctions of classical “stop-and-frisk” theory thus serve to divert at-
tention from the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the reasonable-
ness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s 
personal security.  “Search” and “seizure” are not talismans.  We therefore reject 
the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limita-
tion upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a “technical 
arrest” or a “full-blown search.” 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. 
9. Although the Court did not explicitly decide that an investigative seizure could be made on 
less than probable cause, it is implicit within the Court’s expressed understanding of the relationship 
between suspicion and seizure.  See id. at 19 n.16.  Justice Douglas’s dissent reflects agreement that 
the majority altered the standard for seizures, as well as for searches.  See id. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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procedure came to be known as a “Terry stop.”10  More formally, it is referred 
to as a temporary investigative detention, or some combination of those de-
scriptors.11  Because it is less intrusive than the usual arrest based on probable 
cause, it is reasonable to conduct this form of seizure if “reasonable suspicion” 
exists, a standard requiring less suspicion than probable cause.12 
“Search Lite” in the new regime also is based on less suspicion, and conse-
quently permits a less intrusive search than could be undertaken pursuant to a 
warrant, or under most of the warrant exceptions.  Referred to in Terry by the 
unwieldy phrase, “carefully limited search of the outer clothing,”13 this proce-
dure is known in the criminal justice community as a “frisk”14 or “pat-down.”  
Reasonable suspicion again was the standard adopted by the Terry court, but 
the kind of suspicion required for a “frisk” was not the same as that needed for 
a “stop.”15 
Even if reasonable suspicion is a fixed and knowable point on the contin-
uum of suspicion, admittedly a dubious proposition, suspicion that a person is 
involved in criminal activity is not the same as suspicion that a person may be 
carrying a weapon and intending to use it.  Unfortunately, courts have some-
times conflated these differing types of suspicion or, perhaps, simply ignored 
the difference.16  When reasonable suspicion exists to believe a suspect is about 
to commit a crime, that suspect may, or may not, be armed.  Participation in 
criminal activity is not necessarily indicative of dangerousness, although cer-
tain offenses would support that inference because of the nature of the crime.17 
 
10. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 215 S.W.3d 403, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Woods v. State, 956 
S.W.2d 33, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Overstreet, J., dissenting). 
11. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005) (“detention for investigation”); 
Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“temporary investigative detention”); 
State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1159 (N.J. 1983) (“investigative detentions”). 
12. Tying the degree of intrusion to the quantum of suspicion essentially created a “sliding scale” 
in which reasonableness means different things.  If the government wants to intrude more, it must have 
stronger suspicion.  If it has less, it can do less. 
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
14. Justice Harlan, concurring in Terry, used the terms “stop” and “frisk” to identify the proce-
dures described by the majority. Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
15. See id. at 23 (majority opinion).  
16. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1215.  
17. For example, a person reasonably suspected of committing or attempting armed robbery or 
assault with a deadly weapon may be believed to be armed and dangerous, while a person suspected 
of credit card abuse might not, or at least not solely on the basis of the type crime he is suspected of 
being engaged in.  See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT §9.6(a), at 852–53 (5th ed. 2012) (“It is undoubtedly true, however, that in some cases 
the right to conduct a protective search must follow directly from the right to stop the suspect.”). 
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The purpose of a frisk is not to discover evidence of a crime.18  Its sole 
purpose is to protect the safety of the officer and others.19  This goal, under-
standable and laudable, does not warrant a “search”—even a less intrusive 
one—in the absence of articulable, individualized suspicion, a constitutional 
reality that often is overlooked by judges and magistrates eager to protect of-
ficers from harm.  Consequently, it often also is overlooked by law enforcement 
officers who encounter persons engaged in suspicious behavior.20 
So how does this mix of goals, limitations, and degrees of suspicion play 
out on the streets and in the courts?  Begin with the observation that requiring 
two similar and partly overlapping, but different, levels of suspicion virtually 
assures that one or the other, or both, will be given short shrift.  Because rea-
sonable suspicion to believe a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit an offense must precede any inquiry about whether a person is armed 
and dangerous,21 it is unsurprising that the “second-step” in the reasonableness 
calculation would be the one to suffer.  After all, if a person is believed to be 
involved in criminal activity, wouldn’t the prolonged exposure of the officer 
and presuppositions about the dangerousness of “criminals” dictate that 
measures be taken to safeguard that officer?  And if a weapon or other evidence 
 
18. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (indicating that purpose of frisk is “not to 
discover evidence of crime”).  Responding to the argument that an officer confronting a suspect may 
search for weapons only when the encounter has developed into a custodial arrest for which probable 
cause exists, Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Terry majority: 
There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning, however.  First, it fails 
to take account of traditional limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus 
recognizes no distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a search inci-
dent to an arrest and a limited search for weapons.  The former, although justified 
in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault 
with a concealed weapon, is also justified on other grounds, and can therefore 
involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person.  A search for weapons in 
the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be 
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.  Thus it must 
be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be character-
ized as something less than a “full” search, even though it remains a serious in-
trusion. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26 (citations omitted). 
19. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.  It is not even for the purpose of seizing and safeguarding destructi-
ble evidence that may be in possession of the suspect, as is the case with search incident to arrest.  See 
id. (noting that a protective search, unlike search incident to arrest, “is not justified by any need to 
prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime”). 
20. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1216–17.  
21. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that “[i]n the first place . . . the 
officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter . . .”). 
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is discovered within the allowable scope of a frisk, aren’t the hydraulic pres-
sures to “water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper 
hand”22 likely also to “water down” the scrutiny of the court determining 
whether a second, slightly different version of suspicion was satisfied prior to 
the pat-down being conducted?23 
To make matters worse, the focus of inquiry sometimes seems to have 
shifted from whether a suspect is “armed and dangerous,” to whether the officer 
“feared for his safety.”24 While related, these are very different questions.  In-
evitably, an officer encountering a person suspected of criminal activity will be 
apprehensive about his personal safety, so asking the question in that way in-
variably leads to “yes.”  As will be explored, the shift from an objectively sus-
pected or actual state-of-being (armed and dangerous) to a subjective percep-
tion of danger undermines the constitutional underpinnings of the frisk and 
opens the door to expanded use of the procedure, often without any particular, 
individualized, suspicion.  Substantial evidence exists that this shift already has 
occurred in at least some courts.25 
II. BACK TO THE BASICS: TERRY REVISITED 
The facts in Terry v. Ohio are straight-forward and simple: Detective Martin 
McFadden observed a trio of men walking back and forth in front of a particular 
store during the afternoon in such a way that he concluded they were “casing”26 
the establishment, probably in order to commit a robbery.27  He didn’t actually 
observe the men commit any crime,28 but they “didn’t look right” to Detective 
McFadden.29 
 
22. Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the need for enhanced law en-
forcement options dilutes constitutional guarantees). 
23. Not all courts have succumbed to the temptation to conflate the two kinds of suspicion or 
apply the second less rigorously.  See, e.g., State v. Avans, 444 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App. 2014) 
(stating that frisk of vehicle’s interior during routine traffic stop in which a double-edged sword was 
seen when the officer approached the defendant’s car was not supported by reason to believe the driver 
was armed and dangerous). 
24. Some courts have concluded, quite correctly, that an officer’s subjective lack of fear in a 
given situation does not invalidate a frisk.  See United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 
1990) (indicating that absence of subjective fear that suspects were armed did not alter the court’s 
conclusion that the frisk was objectively reasonable).  Ironically, though, subjective fear has sometimes 
seemed to substitute for an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous. 
25. See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1218–19.  
26. Detective McFadden testified that he suspected the men of “casing a job, a stick-up.”  See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
27. Id. at 4–6. 
28. See id. at 22 (conceding that the men’s acts were “perhaps innocent”). 
29. Id. at 5. 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, explained that the of-
ficer’s observations, taken with his lengthy experience,30 warranted his suspi-
cion that criminal activity was afoot.31  This suspicion apparently justified a 
brief detention of the men in order to investigate those suspicions and confirm 
or dispel them, but the Court expressly held that it was deciding “nothing” re-
garding the “constitutional propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation.”32  The Court 
conceptualized this case as one in which the suspicion required for a frisk ex-
isted independently from that required for a detention, an important distinc-
tion.33  Notwithstanding the Court’s attempt to narrow the scope of its holding, 
it acknowledged that, “[i]f this case involved police conduct subject to the War-
rant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 
‘probable cause’ existed to justify the search and seizure which took place.  
However, that is not the case.”34 
Whatever the Court may have intended regarding seizures without searches, 
it clearly recognized that the frisk is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment,35 and that it was supportable in this instance because Detective’s 
McFadden’s observations reasonably led him to suspect that Terry and his com-
panions were about to commit a crime likely to involve weapons.36  As the 
Court explained, 
The sole justification of the search in the present situation is 
the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it 
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably 
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden in-
struments for the assault of the police officer.37 
Turning its attention to the scope of the “search” for weapons in these cir-
cumstances,38 the Terry majority concluded that patting down the outer clothing 
 
30. Detective McFadden had “30 years’ experience in the detection of thievery from stores in 
this same neighborhood.”  Id. at 23. 
31. Id.  
32. See id. at 19 n.16. 
33. See id. 
34. Id. at 20. 
35. See id. at 26 (arguing that, although frisk may be less than a “full” search, it remains a serious 
intrusion). 
36. Id. at 28. 
37. Id. at 29.  No “general exploratory search” for “evidence” was conducted.  Id. at 30. 
38. The Court refused to generalize about “the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places 
upon a protective seizure and search for weapons,” but reserved those questions for fact-specific de-
velopment.  Id. at 29. 
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of the three suspects presented “no serious problem.”39  It explained, however, 
that McFadden did not reach into the pockets of the men or reach under the 
surface of their clothing “until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached 
for and removed the guns.”40 
Justices Harlan and White wrote concurring opinions reflecting somewhat 
different, but ultimately similar views of the necessary basis for a frisk.41  For 
his part, Justice Harlan emphasized the basis for the detention—the “stop”—
but believed that, once a detention was justified by suspicion of criminal activ-
ity, the right to frisk should be “immediate and automatic.”42  He qualified this 
view by limiting the automatic frisk to “a crime of violence,” but he did not 
explain why he believed Terry’s case to involve such a crime, or what charac-
teristics of a crime would indicate violence and justify the automatic frisk.43 
Justice White seemed to prefer avoiding thorny distinctions between violent 
and nonviolent crimes.  His concurring opinion focused more on the detention 
component, which he concluded “chiefly justifies” the frisk.44  The nature of 
the crime apparently was unimportant in Justice White’s view because the stop 
itself serves useful ends: questions can be asked, and a weapon may be found, 
leading to an arrest.45  Even if no weapon is discovered, the suspect understands 
from the act of frisking that “suspicion has been aroused,” presumably deterring 
any planned criminal act.46 
 
39. See id. 
40. Id. at 29–30.  The Court observed that the officer “confined his search strictly to what was 
minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the 
weapons.”  Id. at 30.  Despite the majority’s disclaimer about describing the scope of a frisk, its opinion 
actually established succinct and reasonably clear guidelines for officers conducting a pat-down. 
41. See id. at 31–35 (Harlan and White, JJ., concurring). 
42. Id. at 33.  Justice Harlan acknowledged that Terry’s responses to questions posed by Officer 
McFadden provided “no reason whatever to suppose that Terry might be armed, apart from the fact 
that [McFadden] suspected him of planning a violent crime.”  Id. 
43. See id. at 33–34.  As Professor Wayne LaFave has observed: 
Lower courts have been inclined to view the right to frisk as being “automatic” 
whenever the suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that he has committed, 
was committing, or was about to commit a type of crime for which the offender 
would likely be armed, whether the weapon would be used to actually commit 
the crime, to escape if the scheme went awry, or for protection against the victim 
or others involved. 
LAFAVE, supra note 17, §9.6(a), at 853. 
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
45. See id. at 34–35. 
46. Id.  
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The sole dissenter, Justice Douglas, decried the abandonment of the proba-
ble cause standard.47  The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, according to Douglas, can be satisfied only by probable cause, and not 
some lesser standard.48  In Justice Douglas’s view, “common rumor or report, 
suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’” was not sufficient to satisfy the 
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.49  If a magistrate could not 
issue an arrest warrant on the facts known to Officer McFadden, the Justice 
noted, police officers should not have the authority to search and seize without 
a warrant.50 
While the “automatic” frisk interpretation preferred by Justices Harlan and 
White was not expressly accepted by the majority, the concept survives in some 
cases involving violent or potentially violent crimes.51  Usually without explic-
itly adopting automatic frisk for these crimes, courts reviewing frisks under-
taken where reasonable suspicion exists to believe a person is about to commit 
a violent crime—and sometimes a nonviolent one—may be unable to resist the 
temptation to ratify a pat-down based on no evidence that the suspect actually 
poses a particular threat.52  This practice may be based on an implicit finding 
that all violent offenses carry potential danger to victims, but even if this is the 
unstated rationale of judges who approve frisks without evidentiary support for 
a finding that the suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not at all clear that Terry 
supports that practice. 
While the Terry opinion initially drew a distinction between the “stop” and 
the “frisk” and the kinds of reasonable suspicion required for each, it concluded 
in a way that confused the issue: 
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes un-
usual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light 
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this be-
havior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 
others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and 
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
 
47. See id. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
48. See id. at 37–38. 
49. Id. (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100–02 (1959)). 
50. See id. at 35–36.  
51. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 27 S.W.3d 688, 694 (Tex. App. 2000). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 694–95. 
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outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him.53 
Was the Court suggesting that suspicion of criminal activity and the mere 
possibility that the suspect may be armed and dangerous justify a frisk?54  Or 
did the Court intend “unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude” 
to modify two separate requirements: that “criminal activity may be afoot” and 
that “the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently danger-
ous”?55  A careful reading of the entire opinion suggests that the Court did not 
mean to approve “automatic frisk” without independent suspicion, but that 
question has remained, particularly when the suspected criminal activity even 
possibly includes a component of violence. 
An example of both the difficulty of identifying a crime of violence and of 
how some courts have effectively ignored the armed and dangerous require-
ment can be found in Griffin v. State.56  The defendant in that case had been 
arrested for possession of cocaine that was in a “long plastic tube” found on his 
person.57  Two days later, Griffin was stopped and frisked because police had 
received a tip from a confidential informant that he was selling cocaine in a 
public place.58  Officers located Griffin and, based on the tip and not on any 
observed wrongdoing, detained and frisked him for “officer safety,” finding 
two cylindrical tubes containing cocaine in his pocket.59 
The arresting officer testified at a suppression hearing that he had known 
Griffin for “[a] couple [of] years” and had never known him to carry a 
weapon.60  At the time the suspect was frisked, the officer said he had no infor-
mation indicating that Griffin was armed or that he might be dangerous.61  Fur-
ther, the officer conceded that he “knew [the long tubes] were not a weapon” 
when he felt them, and that they were not a danger to the officer.62 
Despite this uncontroverted testimony, the trial court denied Griffin’s sup-
pression motion and he was convicted.63  Affirming the denial, the appellate 
court held that the officer “was objectively justified in frisking appellant for 
 
53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
54. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, §9.6(a), at 846–47 (discussing this issue). 
55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
56. 215 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
57. Id. at 405. 
58. Id. at 405–06. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. at 407. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. Id. at 408. 
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weapons” because “it is objectively reasonable for a police officer to believe 
that persons involved in the drug business are armed and dangerous,”64 and that 
belief is unaffected by an officer’s knowledge that the suspect has not carried 
weapons in the past, or is not believed to be dangerous, and “even though the 
officer conducting the frisk in the case at hand testifies that he was not subjec-
tively afraid of the suspect.”65  On defendant’s motion for rehearing, his claim 
was that the court’s decision was “too broad to satisfy Terry” and was incon-
sistent with Richards v. Wisconsin66 in that it treated drug dealers categorically 
as armed and dangerous without regard for the facts of the individual case.67  
After asserting that its prior opinion on original submission “should not be read 
as lessening the requirements of Terry,” the appeals court denied appellant’s 
motion for rehearing, citing again the nature of the suspected offense, the fact 
that the suspect had been arrested for the same crime two days before, and that 
“he moved his hand toward his pocket during the investigative detention.”68 
Setting aside what the officer actually knew about Griffin and his history 
 
64. See id. at 409.  In support of its belief that drug crimes are inherently violent, the court noted 
an FBI press release claiming that in 2001, 23% of the police officers killed in the line of duty, other 
than on September 11th, were investigating “drug-related matters” or “suspicious persons.”  Id. at 409 
n.7.  Half of those deaths occurred during “drug-related matters” and half during unspecified “suspi-
cious persons” investigations. Id.  It certainly is questionable whether, by itself, eight officer deaths in 
a single year qualifies drug dealing as a “crime of violence” sufficient to impose an automatic right to 
search every suspected dealer, even if the Supreme Court had adopted Justice Harlan’s view, which it 
did not. The Court previously had approved a frisk on similar grounds in Carmouche v. State, 10 
S.W.3d 323, 329–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
65. See Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 409–10.  In an earlier case, the same court had held that the validity 
of a frisk is not impaired by an officer’s testimony that he was not afraid of the suspect, but a frisk also 
may not be conducted as a “matter of routine” alone.  See O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000). 
66. 520 U.S. 385, 392–94 (1997); see Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 410.  
67. See Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 410–11.   
68. See id. at 411.  The appellate court acknowledged that it was only Justice Harlan in his con-
curring opinion in Terry who favored the “automatic frisk” in cases of suspected violent crime.  See 
id. at 411 n.4.  The court also recognized that even Justice Harlan, concurring in Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968), the same day Terry was decided, wrote: 
First, although I think that, as in Terry, the right to frisk is automatic when an 
officer lawfully stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a sub-
stantial likelihood that he is armed, it is not clear that suspected possession of 
narcotics falls into this category.  If the nature of the suspected offense creates no 
reasonable apprehension for the officer’s safety, I would not permit him to frisk 
unless other circumstances did so. 
Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 411 n.4. (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see 
also LAFAVE, supra note 17, §9.6(a), at 855–57 (“[T]rafficking in small quantities of narcotics” is 
among the crimes in which “other circumstances” must justify the belief that the suspect is armed and 
dangerous.). 
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of nonviolent encounters with the police—all of which militates against a find-
ing that the suspect was armed and dangerous—the objective, observable cir-
cumstances of the encounter that remain were nonetheless scarce support for a 
frisk.  No suggestion was made in the court’s opinion that more than reasonable 
suspicion existed to believe the defendant was engaged in drug dealing.  The 
officers saw nothing to support the tip other than the suspect’s presence where 
they expected to find him, and only his prior arrest and the informant’s tip tied 
him to selling drugs.69  But at most, and assuming the informant and his tip were 
reliable, those facts gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain Griffin for fur-
ther investigation, and not to believe he was armed and dangerous.  Nothing 
they saw supported that belief other than a vague reference to “mov[ing] his 
hand toward his pocket” while detained, something that must be true for anyone 
wearing trousers with pockets when stopped.70  What is left of the “armed and 
dangerous” finding in Griffin is the highly dubious proposition71 that persons 
selling drugs are so frequently armed and violent72 that everyone suspected of 
that offense must be searched. While that may seem to be so for those who are 
informed primarily by television crime dramas, the Griffin court’s own thin au-
thority for that proposition offers little support. 
III. A TALE OF TWO CASES IN ONE COURT: CONFUSING THE USES OF 
SUSPICION 
Setting aside the categorical treatment of certain offenses as potentially 
dangerous despite the Terry majority’s rejection of that approach, the difficulty 
that courts have in discerning whether an officer reasonably believes a suspect 
to be armed and dangerous is illustrated by two Texas cases in which the same 
court treated very similar situations dissimilarly.  In the first of these, Crain v. 
 
69. See Griffin, 215 S.W.3d at 408–09.  
70. See id. at 409. A person responding to an officer’s command to put his hands behind his back 
will move his hand toward his pocket, as will persons detained on a cold night who are simply trying 
to stay warm.  See People v. Dotson, 345 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding a frisk invalid 
where suspect kept sticking his hands in his pockets on a cold day). 
71. In its Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI 
do not consider drug dealing to be a “violent crime.”  See Crime in the United States—Violent Crime, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/violent-crime 
[https://perma.cc/BXZ8-7Z63] (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).  
72. Among federal and state prisoners who were armed when they committed the crime for which 
they were arrested, less than 9% were committing a drug offense, as opposed to 30–35% of those 
committing a violent crime, and 19–27% committing a “public-order” offense.  See Caroline Wolf 
Harlow, Firearm Use by Offenders, Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facili-
ties, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP. (Nov., 2001), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fuo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7CP-EY9H] (updated February 4, 2002). 
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State,73 a police officer responded to a theft call just after midnight.74  While he 
was on his way to the scene, the officer passed a man “walking in a residential 
area.”75  As the officer drove by, the man “grabb[ed] at his waist.”76  About ten 
minutes later, and after handing off the theft call to another officer, Officer 
Griffin returned to the area where he had seen the man and “found him walking 
across a yard.”77  Stopping his patrol car and shining his spotlight on the sus-
pect, the officer either asked or told him to come over to the car and talk with 
the officer.78 
Griffin later testified that he would have let the man go if he had refused to 
talk with the officer because he had not seen the suspect do anything criminal.79  
Nevertheless, the officer exited his patrol car and approached the suspect, tell-
ing him that he wanted to talk with him.80  When he came close to the suspect, 
the officer smelled what he believed was an odor of “recently smoked mariju-
ana” emanating from the man’s clothes and breath.81  Because the man appeared 
nervous, the officer thought he might be in possession of marijuana, and Griffin 
walked the suspect toward the patrol car, holding the man’s hand behind his 
back.82 
A back-up officer arrived at that time and both officers frisked the suspect.83  
 
73. 315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 




78. See id.  There was some disagreement among the judges about whether the officer ordered 
or requested the suspect to walk over to the patrol car.  See id. at 52 n.39.  Because the court focused 
considerable attention on whether this encounter was an investigative detention (i.e., a Terry stop) or 
was consensual, the finding regarding the nature of the officer’s words took on considerable im-
portance.  See id. at 52. 
79. See id. at 46–47.  The fact that the officer would have let the suspect go about his business if 
he had refused to talk with the officer has no bearing on whether the initial contact was a detention or 
not.  The point of a Terry stop is to allow the officer to maintain the status quo long enough to investi-
gate and confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicion that justified the stop initially. 
80. See id. at 47. 
81. Id.  Assuming that the officer’s testimony regarding the smell of “recently smoked mari-
huana” was credible, continued detention or even arrest might be allowed, depending on whether a 
court would have seen that evidence as sufficient to establish that the suspect was likely to be in pos-
session of the controlled substance.  Potentially, a finding that the odor of marijuana created probable 
cause could have converted the subsequent frisk into a search incident to the man’s arrest, and the 
increased scope of the search allowed following an arrest would have validated the search for, and 
discovery of, the pistol that was found later. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
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A bulge was detected under the suspect’s shirt, and it turned out to be a pistol.84  
The man was arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon, but no other con-
traband was found in a search incident to arrest.85  Officer Griffin testified that 
the defendant never offered any resistance or threatened the officers in any 
way.86 
The trial court denied the defendant’s suppression motion on the grounds 
that the initial encounter was consensual, a finding with which the appellate 
court disagreed.87  After settling the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment 
was implicated by the detention of the suspect, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals readily concluded that the pistol was a fruit of the unjustified detention 
and ordered it suppressed.88  The non-consensual detention was, according to 
the court, not supported by reasonable suspicion, and therefore was unlawful.89 
In finding an absence of reasonable suspicion for the detention, the Texas 
appellate court considered the same facts that would have been germane to a 
determination of whether the officer reasonably believed the suspect to be 
armed and dangerous.  Writing for the majority, Judge Price noted that Officer 
Griffin had testified that there were “[a] hundred different things [the suspect] 
could have been doing” when he reached for his waistband as the officer drove 
by.90  The opinion noted that the officer admitted that the man reaching for his 
waistband “did not necessarily mean that criminal activity was afoot.”91 
Whether “criminal activity was afoot” goes to the basis for the forcible de-
tention, of course.  But it might as easily be said that reaching for his waistband 
was not necessarily indicative of the presence of a weapon.  Just as the suspect’s 
action might have been related to criminal activity, it might have been an at-
tempt to reach a weapon, but the court held the conduct was too ambiguous to 
support an inference of the former, and the same reasoning would prevent a 
finding of the latter.92  Under Texas law at the time of the incident, if reaching 
for the waistband was sufficiently indicative of the carrying of a pistol, the of-
ficer would have had reasonable suspicion to detain the man for violating the 
 
84. Id.  
85. See id. at 46–47. 
86. Id. at 47. 
87. See id. at 53–54.  Had the encounter been consensual, of course, there could have been no 
claim that an unlawful seizure of the person tainted the subsequent discovery of the contraband.  That 
would not by itself have resolved the question of whether the search (frisk) was lawful, but it would 
have changed the analysis away from any consideration of whether the man was armed and dangerous. 
88. See id. at 52–54. 
89. See id.  
90. Id. at 53 (first alteration in original). 
91. Id. 
92. Id.   
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law prohibiting the carrying of a pistol on or about the person.93  It seems obvi-
ous that reasonable suspicion to believe that offense was being committed 
would simultaneously satisfy at least the “armed” portion of the “armed and 
dangerous” requirement. 
Considering other factors that reasonably might have contributed to the of-
ficer’s suspicion, the Crain majority observed: 
Neither time of day nor level of criminal activity in an area 
are suspicious in and of themselves; the two are merely factors 
to be considered in making a determination of reasonable sus-
picion.  Neither fact proves that the suspect is engaged in any 
sort of criminal offense.  In order for these facts to affect the 
assessment of the suspect’s actions, the surroundings must 
raise a suspicion that the particular person is engaged in illegal 
behavior.  Griffin did not offer any testimony that might have 
raised his suspicion that the appellant was engaged in criminal 
activity before he approached the appellant and smelled mari-
huana on him.  We find no other indicia of reasonable suspi-
cion on the record before us.94 
Absent reasonable suspicion to detain the suspect, Officer Griffin also 
lacked legal authority to conduct even a limited search of his person.95  But if 
he had possessed reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, that suspicion by itself 
would not have supported a frisk for weapons.  Reaching for the waistband,96 
the most suspicious act observed by the officer, was insufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the same reasons it should have 
been insufficient to allow a frisk if the detention had been lawful.  When the 
same court was presented an opportunity to decide the issue of potential danger 
on very similar facts less than a year after its ruling in Crain, it took a sharp 
analytical turn away from its prior holding.97 
A police officer on patrol in the early hours of the morning in an area with 
“one of the ‘higher crime rates,’” saw two men walking behind a business that 
was closed for the night.98  Deciding to investigate “what they [were] doing 
back there at that time,” the officer and his partner approached the men.99  The 
officer who had seen the men initially, Officer Barrett, “probably asked them 
 
93. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 2006) (unlawful carrying weapon). 
94. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 53 (footnote omitted). 
95. Id. at 52–53.  
96. Id. at 53.  
97.  See State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 
98. Id. at 462. 
99. One officer approached from the men’s front while his partner, Officer Barrett, approached 
them from the rear.  See id. 
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for ID [and] questioned them why they were walking through there.”100  When 
the men were asked for identification by Officer Barrett, one of the men, Cory 
Castleberry, “was kind of reaching for his waistband.”101  Barrett later testified 
that he “d[id not] know, if he ha[d] a gun or knife.”102  He went on to explain, 
regarding the possible significance of the suspect’s move toward his waistband, 
that, “[t]hat’s commonly where weapons are carried, in the front waistband, 
underneath an untucked shirt.”103 
As soon as Castleberry began to reach toward his waistband, Officer Barrett 
ordered him to put his hands above his head, something he testified he “com-
monly” did to “gain control” in order to “do a patdown.”104  When the suspect 
reached for his waistband again, the officer told him to put his hands behind his 
back so the officer could frisk him, but Castleberry “[p]ull[ed] his right hand 
away from [Officer Barrett’s] control back towards the front of his waistband . 
. . .”105  He was able to gain access to a baggie of cocaine, perhaps from his 
waistband,106 and throw it.107  The cocaine was recovered by the officers, and 
Castleberry was charged with possession.108 
Significantly, Officer Barrett testified later that when he first saw the two 
suspects, neither was carrying any bag or tool, or anything that could be used 
in a burglary.109  He also conceded that there was nothing about them that was 
out of the ordinary.110  According to Castleberry’s testimony, he was walking 
to his apartment from a bar, which was about a block from where he was 
stopped.111  The area, Castleberry said, was “not dangerous at all,” and he al-
ways walked through the parking lot behind the restaurant where he had been 
detained.112  He had a compact disc in his waistband, Castleberry testified, and 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 462–63. 
102. Id. at 463. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. (first alteration in original). 
106. The court’s opinion does not indicate where the cocaine had been before Castleberry threw 
it, presumably because that fact was unknown to the officers. 
107. Id.  
108.  Id. at 462–63. 
109. Id. at 463. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See id.  The defendant testified at his suppression hearing that there was “quite a bit” of foot 
traffic through the area at 3:00 a.m.  Id. 
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no weapon was found in his possession when Officer Barrett searched him fol-
lowing his arrest.113 
The trial court and the intermediate court of appeals in State v. Castleberry 
found that the detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion.114  The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, disagreed, holding—contrary to 
what one might expect in light of its decision in Crain v. State—that Castle-
berry’s act of reaching for his waistband provided the necessary support for 
transforming a consensual encounter into an investigative detention.115 
In his opinion for the majority, Judge Keasler found that Castleberry and 
his companion “would have felt free to decline Officer Barrett’s request for 
identification” when they were first approached by the two officers.116  After 
observing that “an officer is just as free as anyone to question, and request iden-
tification from, a fellow citizen,” Judge Keasler concluded that “the interaction 
was a consensual encounter.”117 
Nothing was said in the majority’s opinion about whether a person being 
approached by two uniformed officers, one in front and one in back, would feel 
free to push past them and continue on his way home.118  The Castleberry ma-
jority acknowledged its prior language in Garcia-Cantu v. State, in which the 
court observed that a “reasonable person would feel freer to terminate or ignore 
a police encounter in the middle of the day in a public place where other people 
are nearby than he would when parked on a deserted, dead-end street at 4:00 
a.m.”119  The situation in Castleberry was different, according to Judge Keasler, 
because the defendant was walking in an area reasonably well-lit with “quite a 
bit” of foot traffic, facts that the Court believed freed the suspect to say “no” 
and continue to his apartment.120 
Having concluded that the encounter did not fall under Fourth Amendment 
 
113. Id. 
114. See id. at 463–65.  The opinion from the Dallas court of appeals was not designated for 
publication. 
115. See id. at 469. 
116. Id. at 467. 
117. See id. at 468.  In the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, an officer 
may not demand and require a person to produce identification.  See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 
(1979).  In Brown, officers stopped two men seen walking away from each other in an alley.  Id. at 48–
49.  Despite having no reason to suspect Brown of any specific misconduct, or to believe that he was 
armed, the officers asked for identification and an explanation of Brown’s presence.  See id. Instead of 
producing either, Brown refused and “angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop him.”  Id. 
at 49.  He was frisked before being arrested for failing to identify himself.  See id.  
118. See Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 468.  
119. Id. at 468 (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 245 n.42 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2008)). 
120. See id.  
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protection, the Court turned its attention to whether Castleberry’s act of reach-
ing toward his waistband was innocent behavior, as the trial court and lower 
court of appeals held.121  Again, the court of criminal appeals disagreed with 
the lower courts.  Those courts had reasoned that when Barrett asked Castle-
berry for identification and he reached for his waistband, he might have been 
complying with the officer’s request or command, a finding consistent with the 
court of criminal appeals’ holding in Crain.122  Judge Keasler, writing for the 
majority, noted a passage from a 1997 opinion in which the court of criminal 
appeals wrote that “[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive 
the officer of the capacity to entertain reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.  
Indeed, the principal function of [an] investigation is to resolve that very ambi-
guity.”123 
While the quoted language from Woods v. State expresses an obvious legal 
truism—that reasonable suspicion and a possible innocent explanation are not 
mutually exclusive—it certainly does not lessen the prosecution’s burden to 
show reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.  Citing 
Glazner v. State,124 a case in which “the officer saw what looked like a knife in 
[the suspect’s] pocket” and proceeded to frisk him, the Castleberry majority 
reasoned that, although Officer Barrett “had no reason to believe Castleberry 
was a threat, nor did the officer immediately observe any weapons,” he never-
theless was entitled to believe that “his . . . safety may be in danger” because 
the suspect reached for his waistband.125  To bolster its finding that the officer’s 
belief was reasonable, the Court noted that Castleberry was found in a high 
crime area and behind a closed restaurant.126 
Of course, the Glazner case was inapposite in deciding whether Officer 
Barrett had reasonable suspicion that Castleberry was armed and dangerous.  
Seeing what appeared to be a knife in a suspect’s pocket would have provided 
ample suspicion of potential danger, whereas Barrett admitted that, other than 
a general concern about waistbands as potential hiding places for weapons, he 
 
121. See id. 
122. Id.; see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).   
123. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 468 (quoting Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997)). 
124. 175 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
125. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 469. 
126. See id.  Reliance on the character of a location says little about whether persons in that 
neighborhood will be armed.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said in United States 
v. Villanueva, “we remind police that the character of a neighborhood does not provide automatic per-
mission [to frisk]; every case must be considered on its own reasons for suspicion of danger.”  United 
States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 
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had no reason to believe that the suspect was armed or dangerous,127 a point 
conceded in Judge Keasler’s majority opinion.128 
It is noteworthy in two respects that the Castleberry court resorted to the 
phrase “his or her safety may be in danger” to support its conclusion that the 
detention was reasonable.129  Firstly, safety concerns are not relevant to the in-
itial determination in a Terry stop.  Prior to any consideration of whether to 
frisk, an officer must determine whether a suspect may be “seized” by detaining 
him or her for investigation.130  That decision turns on whether there is reason-
able suspicion to believe a crime has been, is being, or is about to be, commit-
ted.131 The focus for the detention is criminal activity, not danger to the officer 
or others.132  A “stop and frisk” is divided into two separate activities: the “stop” 
(seizure of the person) and the “frisk” (search of the person).133  For the former, 
safety is not the motivating governmental interest.134 
Secondly, there was no factual support for the safety concerns that the Court 
believed to be present.  While a “possible” innocent explanation for Castle-
berry’s movement toward his waistband would not negate a reasonable suspi-
cion that he was armed, reaching toward his waistband also would not, by itself, 
provide more than the most speculative link.  Officer Barrett requested identi-
fication, and the suspect immediately moved his hand in the general direction 
of his waistband.135  On a list of possible explanations for that action, it is hard 
to see how obtaining a weapon would rank as highly as the more obvious and 
logical explanation: that he was producing the requested identification.136 
Judge Cochran, writing for the majority in Wade v. State,137 a 2013 decision 
 
127. See Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 463, 469.  
128. See id.  The majority opinion plainly states that “[a]t that point, [the point at which Castle-
berry reached for his waistband], Officer Barrett did not know if Castleberry was carrying a weapon.”  
Id. 
129. Id.  
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).  
131. See id. at 26. 
132. Id. at 22.  
133. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (distinguishing be-
tween suspicion required for detention and safety concern justifying frisk). 
134. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–23.   
135. State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 462–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).  
136. Castleberry may, for example, have been reaching for his back pocket to retrieve his wallet 
and identification, or for his pocket, or even for his waistband, all in an effort to comply with the 
officer’s request.  Virtually any movement of his hands in a direction other than straight up would have 
been a movement toward his waistband.  The Court’s narrow inference that he was trying to obtain a 
weapon presupposes that waistbands are where weapons usually are kept, and that movements toward 
a waistband are likely to be motivated by a desire to obtain a weapon.   
137. 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).  
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by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and discussing Castleberry—a case in 
which she dissented—offered the explanation that “when asked for his identi-
fication, Castleberry reached for his waistband (as opposed to his pocket where 
a wallet would normally be kept), an act that could be reasonably construed as 
reaching for a weapon.”138  This post-hoc speculation about where a male sus-
pect might keep his belongings is as close as the Court ever came to justifying 
the “reasonableness” of the officer’s belief. 
As to the Castleberry court’s possible reliance on the “high crime” nature 
of the neighborhood and the location of the stop, neither factor related logically 
to the ultimate question preceding a frisk: Was there reasonable suspicion that 
the suspect was both armed and dangerous?139  And it must be remembered that 
the same court, just a year earlier in Crain, had said that: 
Neither time of day nor level of criminal activity in an area 
are suspicious in and of themselves; the two are merely factors 
to be considered in making a determination of reasonable sus-
picion.  Neither fact proves that the suspect is engaged in any 
sort of criminal offense.  In order for these facts to affect the 
assessment of the suspect’s actions, the surroundings must 
raise a suspicion that the particular person is engaged in illegal 
behavior.140 
Admittedly, the court was not dealing with the propriety of a frisk, both 
because a frisk never actually occurred and because the judges already had de-
cided that the encounter was consensual.141  But the court’s observations and 
reasoning regarding whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was cre-
ated by the circumstances, especially the suspect’s reaching for his waistband, 
are very instructive in understanding its view on that unanswered question of 
whether a frisk might be justified.142 
 
138. See id. at 675 (citing State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). 
139. In People v. Linley, 903 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), the Appellate Court of Illinois 
considered a situation not unlike that in Castleberry.  An officer responding to a shots-fired call saw 
the defendant standing outside a residence in a high-crime area.  Id. at 794.  According to the officer’s 
testimony, the suspect appeared to be considering fleeing when he saw the officer approaching, so the 
officer immediately frisked him.  Id.  The appeals court, unlike the Castleberry court, described the 
propriety of the stop as of “purely academic interest” as it readily concluded the frisk was unlawful.  
Id. at 798.  Despite finding the suspect in a high-crime area to which he had been dispatched on a report 
of shots being fired, and concluding that the suspect was considering fleeing, the officer observed 
nothing particularly unusual according to the court, and certainly nothing that would justify a reason-
able belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous.  Id. 
140. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
141. See State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  
142. State v. Castleberry was briefly revisited in Wade, 422 S.W.3d 661.  The majority opinion, 
REAMEY-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:21 PM 
250 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:231 
IV. A NEW YORK STATE OF MIND: ON AUTOMATIC FRISKS 
The holdings in Crain and Castleberry suggest a need for close scrutiny of 
the justifications proffered for investigative detentions, and particularly of the 
bases for the additional intrusion of frisking suspects.  Those opinions, how-
ever, serve only as relatively unknown examples of the inconsistent ways in 
which courts treat this procedure.  Stop-and-frisk, a term and concept very fa-
miliar within the world of criminal justice, came to the public’s attention with 
unprecedented force in the case of Floyd v. City of New York.143  Floyd was a 
class-action suit filed in 2008 against New York City challenging the police 
department’s wide-spread, and allegedly racially motivated, use of stop-and-
frisk as a crime control measure.144 
The litigation in Floyd focused primarily on the claim that minority resi-
dents of New York City, particularly African-American and Latino residents, 
were being targeted by the police for detention in an effort to reduce the inci-
dence of crime and reverse the city’s reputational decline by focusing on greatly 
increased police contact with low-level offenders.145  And crime levels did fall 
substantially during the period in which the NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk rose 
dramatically.146 
Not surprisingly, racial profiling and the startling increase in stops of “sus-
pects” were the issues that predominated news accounts of the litigation and, 
eventually, of the lengthy opinion of Judge Shira Scheindlin, who found for the 
plaintiffs in the case.147  Judge Scheindlin’s opinion and the evidence produced 
in Floyd contained a wealth of data on the use of stop-and-frisk by the police, 
including statistics on frisks—as opposed to the stops that preceded them—and 
the “success” rates for those frisks.148 
 
penned by Judge Cochran who had dissented in Castleberry, took an arguably narrower view of rea-
sonable suspicion to detain, and especially of what constitutes a consensual encounter.  Citing Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), the court held that the totality of suspicious circumstances on which 
an officer relies “must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent people under the same 
circumstances as to clearly, if not conclusively, set the suspect apart from them.”  See Wade v. State, 
422 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).  
143. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
144. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Stopping Stop-and-Frisk, 100 A.B.A.J. 38, 39–40 (Mar. 2014). 
145. See id. at 39. 
146. Between 1990 and 2014, murders declined by 85% and rapes by more than half. Id.  Bur-
glaries decreased nearly 86% and robberies fell by 80%.  Id. 
147. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-
rights-judge-rules.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y8QX-VE73] (chronicling the racial implications of 
New York’s stop-and-frisk policy). 
148. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59. 
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Thanks to a settlement reached in the 2003 case of Daniels v. City of New 
York,149 a class action lawsuit also challenging the stop-and-frisk policy and 
practice of the NYPD, detailed reporting data were available to the Floyd plain-
tiffs for the years leading up to their own attack on the procedure.  Those data 
reflected that, “[t]he number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 
2004 to a high of 686,000 in 2011.”150  Reporting on the Floyd decision, the 
New York Times observed that, “the stops were not the end of the problem, 
Judge Scheindlin found.  After officers stopped people, they often conducted 
frisks for weapons, or searched the subjects’ pockets for contraband, like drugs, 
without any legal grounds for doing so.”151 
The New York Civil Liberties Union, using data from quarterly reports re-
leased by the NYPD, analyzed the practice of stop-and-frisk in New York City 
in 2012.152  Discussing unwarranted frisks, the NYCLU report concluded that, 
Data from 2012 stops indicate that NYPD officers are rou-
tinely frisking people without suspicion that the person has a 
weapon.  Of the 532,911 stops last year[], officers conducted 
frisks in 297,244 of them, or 55.8 percent of all stops.  While 
this figure alone strongly suggests that officers are engaging in 
far too many frisks, the concern that officers are unjustifiably 
frisking people is clearly demonstrated by the fact that weap-
ons were found in only 2 percent of the instances in which 
frisks were conducted in 2012.153 
That same report noted that the 110th Precinct in Queens had the highest 
frisk rate in 2012, with 81.4 percent of stops including frisks.154  Blacks and 
Latinos were far more likely than whites to be frisked throughout the city,155 
but whites were much more likely to be found in possession of a weapon when 
frisked.156  As for the recovery of guns, as opposed to all kinds of weapons, the 
NYCLU report found only a marginal increase in guns found when the number 
of frisks increased greatly.157  In 2003, 160,851 people were stopped and 633 
 
149. See Ward, supra note 144, at 40. 
150. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558. 
151. See Goldstein, supra note 147. 
152. Christopher Dunn, Stop-And-Frisk 2012, NYCLU BRIEFING (May 2013), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM9Q-
BH7X]. 
153. See id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
154. See id. 
155. 89.2% of all frisks in New York City in 2012 were of blacks and Latinos, only 7.6% were 
of whites.  Id. at 9. 
156. Only 1.8% of blacks and Latinos were carrying weapons when frisked, while 3.9% of whites 
were armed.  Id. at 10. 
157. See id. at 13.  
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guns were recovered, while in 2012, 532,911 people were stopped but only 729 
of those produced guns, an additional 96 guns for more than 372,000 additional 
stops.158 
The New York City data certainly call into question the effectiveness of 
frisk during that period in the city’s history to make police officers safer during 
encounters with suspects.  It is not possible, however, to conclude more from 
these data than they will bear.  If, as Judge Scheindlin found, the culprit here 
was racially based detentions for which inadequate, or no, suspicion of wrong-
doing existed, one would expect the rate of gun recovery, for example, to be 
very low.  Were these data indicative of a general overestimation of the danger 
in most encounters?  Were they the product of excessively zealous and aggres-
sive pursuit of statistics-driven benchmarks?  Or did they reflect a widespread 
tolerance by courts, or maybe indifference by defense counsel, of a very broad 
and unfounded suspicion by the police that people are armed and up to no good? 
V. IF IT’S ONE, THEN IT’S TWO 
Consideration of specific cases in which courts have found circumstantial 
support for the “armed and dangerous” prerequisite to a frisk cannot yield a 
definitive answer as to whether courts generally are rigorous in their assess-
ments of the second-prong of Terry.  It can, however, highlight the difficulties 
courts encounter in making this important decision, and these cases sometimes 
can illustrate the ways in which judges conducting after-the-fact analysis while 
possessed of full knowledge of what the frisk uncovered succumb to the temp-
tation to validate. 
Two cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for exam-
ple, reflect the struggle that trial courts, and ultimately appeals courts, have with 
the “armed and dangerous” requirement.  In the first of these, United States v. 
Thompson,159 officers stopped a vehicle for minor traffic offenses.160  When the 
driver, Hewey Lee Thompson, was unable to produce his driver’s license, he 
was asked for anything that might confirm the name he had given the police.161  
He gave the officers an envelope in his car that was addressed to him.162 
Officer Ault asked the driver to step out of his car and come to the police 
car while his license was checked through the police dispatcher, something that 
 
158. Id. at 14. 
159. 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979). 
160. Id. at 188.  The car had a broken taillight lens, and the driver was “slightly” exceeding the 
speed limit and had rolled through a stop sign.  Id.  
161. Id. at 188. 
162. Id. at 188–89. 
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was later said to be standard procedure.163  Because Mr. Thompson was going 
to be put in the police car during this check, standard police procedure required 
that he be frisked for weapons, and he was.164 
Nothing was found during the frisk, but as it was occurring, Thompson “re-
moved his left hand from the police car three or four times and attempted to 
reach for his inside coat pocket ‘as if [he were] going for something.’”165  Of-
ficer Ault later testified that Thompson was wearing a bulky overcoat and 
“[j]ust to pat it you couldn’t feel sufficiently to find anything out.”166  Because 
Thompson continued to try to reach his pocket, he was handcuffed and the 
pocket was searched.167  Inside was an envelope that contained checks stolen 
from the mail.168 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Thompson’s failure to produce a driver’s 
license, “justified the request that he get out of his car and sit in the police car 
while a standard police identification process took place.”169  The court’s entire 
analysis of the initial frisk consisted of the holding that “[u]nder the circum-
stances, the actions of the officers, including the pat-down, were also reasona-
ble under Terry.”170  The court then turned its attention to Thompson’s repeated 
attempts to reach inside his pocket during the frisk, and decided that Officer 
Ault was entitled to put his hand into the pocket and retrieve the envelope, alt-
hough he went too far when he looked inside the envelope and saw the checks 
that were determined to be stolen.171 
Viewed more rigorously, the circumstances at the inception of the frisk sup-
port only a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed traffic of-
fenses, along with the crime of failing to produce a license, none of which bear 
the slightest suggestion that he was armed and dangerous.  It was at the insist-
ence of Officer Ault that Thompson sat inside the police car, necessitating the 
frisk.  Had Thompson been offered that option instead of being directed to do 
so, even if it was conditioned on submitting to a frisk, his consent would have 
obviated any need for a search analysis, but the opinion contains nothing indi-
cating that Thompson had a choice.172  In the absence of his consent, and of 
 
163. Id. at 189. 
164. Id.   
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167.  Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 190. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 190–91. 
172. It seems reasonable to allow police officers to require anyone being offered a seat in a patrol 
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some facts—any facts—hinting at the possibility that he was a threat to the of-
ficers or others, Thompson never should have been frisked.  And, of course, if 
he had not been frisked, he would not have been reaching for the pocket where 
the envelope and checks were found, leaving the officers no reason at all to 
inspect the contents of that pocket. 
Although the Thompson court ultimately reached the right result, it did so 
by glossing over the critical issue that would have yielded that result sooner and 
more directly: The frisk of Thompson was unlawful at its inception because 
there was no evidence that he was armed and dangerous.173  Simply asserting 
that unspecified “circumstances” justified a pat-down fails even to address 
Terry’s required type and level of suspicion. 
Thompson stands in stark contrast to United States v. Thomas,174 another 
Ninth Circuit frisk case.  The police were notified by a storeowner that two men 
were offering counterfeit money to passers-by on a certain street.175  The store-
owner described the men, and their descriptions and location were broadcast to 
officers, including Officer Siegel who was about a block away from the 
scene.176  Siegel saw a car trying to exit through a parking lot entrance across 
the street from the place where the men had been reported to be passing coun-
terfeit money, so he pulled his patrol vehicle in front of the car and signaled for 
it to stop.177 
The driver, Robert Thomas, stopped his car and got out, walking back to-
ward the officer who was out of his car and approaching on foot.178  Thomas 
explained that he had been in the parking lot waiting for his wife to come out 
of a nearby bank.179  At Officer Siegel’s request, Mr. Thomas produced his 
 
vehicle to be frisked as a condition of entering the vehicle.  If, however, an officer can order a person 
to sit in a police car, a frisk should be conducted only with either the consent of the civilian or reason-
able suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.  To do otherwise is to allow the police in effect 
to frisk anyone simply by ordering that person to sit in their vehicle. 
173. See Thompson, 597 F.2d at 191.  In United States v. AM, the court of appeals dealt with a 
case in which a suspect who was approached by the police “did an ‘about face’ and thrust his hand into 
his pocket.”  United States v. AM, 564 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2009).  The Court approved the frisk, not 
only—as in Thompson—because the man put his hand in his pocket when he saw the police, but be-
cause the officers knew the suspect had a criminal history and was affiliated with a gang, he was on 
probation, and was known to carry guns.  Id.  He also was found walking alone in the territory of a 
rival gang, an area that was known as a high-crime area.  Id.  In Thompson, none of those factors were 
known to the officers.  
174. 863 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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driver’s license.180  Without returning the license, Siegel then asked Thomas if 
he had any weapons, and Thomas gave no response.181  The officer patted down 
the man’s clothing and felt what he thought was a handgun in a jacket pocket.182  
Thomas and a passenger in his car subsequently were arrested and charged with 
an armed bank robbery that had occurred earlier in the day.183  Evidence of that 
crime was found in the defendant’s car.184 
The propriety of the frisk was the issue in the case, and that issue was not 
confused with the reasonableness of the initial stop, for which the court found 
reasonable suspicion.185  Acknowledging that “[a] lawful frisk does not always 
flow from a justified stop,”186 the appeals court held that there was nothing “in-
herently suspicious” about the fact that Thomas got out of his car without being 
asked to do so.187  In fact, once Thomas was out of the vehicle, Officer Siegel 
could see that he did not match the description of either counterfeiting sus-
pect.188  Asking why Thomas was leaving the parking lot, and requesting his 
license, were reasonable, the court held, but Thomas responded in a way that 
was not suspicious.189 
Officer Siegel’s testimony at the suppression hearing shed light on his mo-
tivation for frisking Robert Thomas: 
Q.  Officer Siegel, why did you pat Mr. Thomas down? 
A.  Basically for my own safety.  I was by myself.  I was in-
vestigating a felony.  There were two of them, one of me.  I 
didn’t want any surprises.  So I patted down just about every-
thing under that kind of circumstance. 
Q.  Did the size or appearance of Mr. Thomas in any way con-
tribute to your decision to patting him down? 






184. Id. at 624–25. 
185. Id. at 627–28. 
186. Id. at 628. 
187. Id.  Earlier in my experience as a licensed driver, getting out of the car during a traffic stop 
before being asked to was considered a cooperative, non-threatening gesture.  It subsequently became 
common practice for officers to instruct drivers and passengers to stay in the vehicle.  Either routine 
carries its own safety risks and benefits for the officer making the stop.  Regardless of whether the 
driver exits the vehicle without being asked to do so, it is difficult to interpret either response as threat-
ening in and of itself.  See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 29, 78 P.3d 590 (“[O]rdering the occupants 
out of the vehicle may remove or substantially reduce the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop.”). 
188. Thomas, 863 F.2d at 628. 
189. See id. at 628–29. 
REAMEY-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:21 PM 
256 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:231 
didn’t want to get in any trouble.  I wanted to see what was in 
front of me, make sure they didn’t have a weapon on them.190 
While the officer’s apprehension was understandable and, as it turned out, 
confirmed by finding not one, but two pistols during the search of Thomas and 
his companion, the continued detention necessary to conduct the frisk, or even 
to ask Thomas whether he had any weapons, was not based at that time on 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or danger.191  In short, the officer was 
taking a precaution not prompted by any actual evidence that would have satis-
fied the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be supported by “rea-
sonable” suspicion rather than fear, a hunch, or caution. 
The government argued, in essence, that Officer Siegel had no choice in 
deciding to frisk Thomas: “He surely couldn’t turn his back and walk away.  If 
it was reasonable for him to investigate further by asking questions, it was rea-
sonable for [Siegel] to pat-down the exterior of [Thomas’] clothing.”192  This 
argument was no more than an expression of a common sentiment among law 
enforcement officers that continued close contact with a person suspected of 
crime entails risks that can by lessened in part by checking for weapons.193  The 
fallacy of this approach, however, is that it seeks to explain and rationalize po-
lice behavior that, while perhaps prudent, is based not only on fear of the un-
known, but on fear of the unsuspected.  In responding to the government’s ar-
gument in Thomas, the Ninth Circuit concluded: 
If we followed the government’s logic, all investigatory stops 
 
190. Id. at 629. 
191. The court noted that,  
 Officer Siegel had no reason to continue the detention after he had asked his 
initial investigatory questions, and yet he asked Thomas whether he had any 
weapons.  Under the circumstances of this case, the question concerning weapons 
was not prompted by Officer Siegel’s reasonable belief that Thomas might be 
armed and presently dangerous, and therefore, the question was not justified.   
Id.  Nothing in the record suggested that anything about the defendant’s appearance supported a con-
cern that he was armed.  See id.  As the court observed, “[a]n officer cannot simply frisk all ‘pretty big’ 
guys without more specific objective reasons why the suspect posed a risk to the safety of the officer.”  
Id.  In this case, the officer’s action reflected a “perfunctory attitude towards frisking a suspect once a 
justified stop has occurred.”  Id. 
192. Id. at 629–30 (second alteration in original). 
193. In my own experience as a police legal advisor and consultant, I very often have observed 
officers doing everything possible to ensure their safety during an encounter with anyone who is not 
another law enforcement officer.  This safety consciousness is particularly acute in cases in which the 
officer is dealing with someone suspected of having committed a crime, even if that crime was not an 
inherently dangerous one, or one in which weapons typically are used.  As a matter of training and 
practice, this hyper-caution may be entirely appropriate, but it can lead—as in the Thomas case—to 
the use of procedures not countenanced by law. 
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would necessarily include a frisk.  Without any reason whatso-
ever, a police officer could routinely ask about weapons and 
frisk the individual under suspicion.  Such a result would not 
only destroy the necessary distinction between the stop and 
frisk, but would indiscriminately subject countless individuals 
to the humiliation and invasiveness of a bodily frisk.  We can-
not allow the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
to be tampered with so carelessly.194 
This government argument and court response neatly capture the crux of 
the problem: The dictates of safety may be inconsistent with the demands of 
individual rights.  Striking the right balance between these competing interests 
can be agonizingly difficult for courts genuinely sympathetic to the safety con-
cerns of law enforcement, but committed to protecting the liberty interests es-
sential in maintaining a free society. 
The temptation facing all courts trying to untie this Gordian knot is to sever 
it by playing fast and loose with the characterization of facts and what reason-
able inferences can be drawn from them, or by ignoring the logical and probable 
significance of circumstances altogether.  Both the trial and appeals courts in 
United States v. Thompson195 could be seen as succumbing to this temptation, 
while the trial and appeals courts in United States v. Thomas196 resisted it. 
This quandary is acknowledged and discussed with refreshing candor by a 
state appeals court in Texas.197  In that case, Williams v. State, two officers 
stopped a car for not having a working license plate light.198  The driver got out 
of his car, as did the officers.199  One of the officers, Officer Meaux, took the 
driver’s license from Mr. Williams to run a warrant check.200  As he did so, the 
officer turned his back to the motorist, a move his partner, Officer Wasser, char-
acterized as a “violation of officer safety.”201 
Because the driver was “dressed in clothing that . . . was unusual for the 
weather temperature,”202 Officer Wasser testified that he “conducted a pat-
 
194. Id. at 630. 
195. 597 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1979). 
196. 863 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988). 
197. See Williams v. State, 27 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App. 2000). 
198. Id. at 690. 
199. Id.  
200. See id. 
201. See id.  Officer Wasser was a field-training officer with whom Officer Meaux was riding.  
See id. at 695. 
202.  Id. at 690.  In his testimony at the suppression hearing, Officer Wasser said, “I was in short 
sleeves, and I believe Officer Meaux was also in short sleeves.  This subject had on a heavy, black 
coat, also a toboggan on his head . . . .”  Id. 
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down of the subject’s outer clothing for both my safety and for Officer Meaux’s 
safety.”203  His testimony continued with the following exchange: 
Q.  And why did you feel that that was necessary for your and 
Officer Meaux’s safety? 
A.  As I said, Officer Meaux committed what I call an officer 
safety violation, in my opinion.  He turned his back.  So, I’m 
the only officer speaking with the violator.  It’s normal routine 
whenever I do remove a subject or a violator from a vehicle or 
anybody, any occupant of a vehicle which is in a violator vehi-
cle, when I make contact, to pat down their outer clothing for 
my safety.204 
In further questioning, Officer Wasser said that Williams’ “unusual” dress, 
the fact that he got out of his car rather than sitting and waiting for the officers 
to approach, and “signs of nervousness”—looking around instead of making 
eye-to-eye contact—were the reasons that he frisked the driver.205  But he also 
confirmed that “there wasn’t any indication before [he] started to put [his] 
hands on Mr. Williams of any weapons besides he just had baggy clothes and 
nervousness . . . .”206 
During the frisk, Officer Wasser felt an object in Williams’ pocket and 
asked him what it was.207  Without replying, Williams took a matchbox out of 
his pocket and opened it, revealing the cocaine that was inside.208  The defend-
ant’s suppression argument was that the frisk was not justified, and not that the 
initial traffic stop was not warranted or that the frisk exceeded its lawful scope, 
but the trial court rejected that argument.209 
The appeals court210 began its analysis of the frisk issue in the usual way, 
by citing, quoting, and emphasizing Terry v. Ohio and the requirements for and 
purposes of the pat-down.211  But the Williams court then took an unusually 
candid turn, writing that “[j]udging by recent cases where the issue focuses on 
 
203. Id. at 691. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. at 691–92.  
206. Id. at 692. 
207. Id. at 690 n.1.  
208. Id. 
209. See id. at 690. 
210. Texas is one of only two states to have a bifurcated appellate system.  The highest court for 
criminal appeals is the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and not the Texas Supreme Court, which 
hears only civil matters.  Texas has fourteen intermediate courts of appeals which hear both civil and 
criminal cases.  See Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story of Two High 
Courts, 53 THE JUDGES’ J. 30 (2014).  The Williams appeal was heard by one of these intermediate 
courts, the one sitting in Beaumont.  See Williams, 27 S.W.3d 688. 
211. See Williams, 27 S.W.3d at 692–93. 
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the propriety of a Terry pat-down, it would appear that so long as the officer 
involved utters the talismanic words ‘officer safety,’ the pat-down will [be] held 
to be reasonable.”212 
In considering the facts of the case before it, the court also acknowledged 
that the offense of driving with an inoperable license plate light was not the sort 
of offense “that would rise to the level of implicit danger . . . so as to permit 
Wasser to reasonably believe that appellant was presently armed and danger-
ous.”213  Notwithstanding the danger inherent in any traffic stop, which was 
duly noted in Williams, the court concluded its opinion with remarkable candor: 
Thus, we are placed on a rather precarious perch regarding 
the nature of the facts in the instant case.  By the plain language 
in Terry and Carmouche, Officer Wasser’s belief that appellant 
was “presently armed and dangerous” was unreasonable.  On 
the other hand, we have great difficulty in saying that Officer 
Wasser’s admitted usual practice of patting-down virtually 
everyone he encounters during routine traffic stops is, “in light 
of his experience,” unreasonable.  It is common knowledge that 
America is awash in a sea of handguns, and the inherent danger 
to police officers when confronting individuals following “rou-
tine” traffic stops is certainly not lost on this Court.  While we 
cannot say that Officer Wasser’s belief of appellant’s present 
dangerousness, under the Terry and Carmouche “reasonable-
ness” construct, was valid, we are not going to second guess an 
officer who has legitimately made a stop for a traffic violation, 
without a hint of pretext, and find he acted unreasonably in pat-
ting the motorist down for the officer’s protection.  Therefore, 
in light of his experience as a patrol officer and a field training 
officer, Officer Wasser’s actions in patting appellant down for 
his safety and the safety of Officer Meaux were reasonable not-
withstanding the fact that at the time the pat-down took place 
there was no indication appellant was “armed and presently 
dangerous.”214 
VI. HEADS, THE POLICE WIN; TAILS, YOU LOSE 
One might say, not that it is the rare exception that citizens stopped by the 
police are frisked, but rather that it is relatively easy for the police to frisk with-
out concern that a court will disapprove.  Consider what the cases examined in 
this article demonstrate: 
 
212. Id. at 693. 
213. Id. at 694. 
214. Id. at 694–95. 
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1. The kinds of reasonable suspicion required by the Supreme Court 
in Terry are sometimes undifferentiated.  Suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot seems simultaneously to authorize both the tempo-
rary investigative detention (seizure of the person) and the pat-
down, or frisk, of the outer clothing (search).215 
2. Suspicion of certain kinds of criminal wrongdoing (e.g., drug deal-
ing) automatically satisfies the “armed and dangerous” requirement 
for a frisk because those activities are considered inherently dan-
gerous and likely to involve weapons.216 
3. Ambiguous, and often quite innocent, gestures and reactions to be-
ing detained are deemed to be indicative of the possible presence 
of a weapon, even though neither the suspected crime nor the sur-
rounding circumstances suggest that any danger exists, and the law 
enforcement officer is not threatened by the suspect’s actions.217 
4. A frisk can be necessitated by requiring a person to sit in a police 
vehicle while certain administrative tasks are being completed.218 
5. When a police officer invokes “officer safety,” and frisks a suspect 
during a detention, the frisk will not be disapproved, even if no ob-
jectively reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous 
exists.219 
There are, of course, also many cases in which a pat-down was held not to 
be justified by sufficient suspicion.220  But it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the balance, probably more at the trial level than on appeal, is tilted in favor 
of allowing the search.221 
No one can doubt that policing is sometimes dangerous work, and the pub-
lic’s and government’s interests in keeping law enforcement officers as safe as 
possible is both strong and undisputed.  Surely the need for officer safety has 
 
215. See supra Part I. 
216. See supra Part II. 
217. See supra Part III. 
218. See supra Part V. 
219. See supra Part V. 
220. See, e.g., Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Crain v. State, 315 
S.W.3d 43, 53 (Tex. Crim. App.  2010). 
221. My own experience as a police legal advisor and long-time law enforcement educator cer-
tainly supports the notion that trial courts are especially solicitous of the safety concerns expressed by 
officers in support of a decision to frisk.  Most of my experience has been in Texas, a state that contin-
ues to elect judges at all levels.  It is possible, too, that elected judges are more reluctant to be seen to 
be questioning or “second-guessing” the decisions of officers in the field.  Or, their decisions may 
simply reflect an unfamiliarity with police work and the actual, as opposed to the possible or theoreti-
cal, dangers inherent in encounters with suspicious persons. 
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been reiterated most forcefully and tragically by the rash of officer shootings 
the United States has experienced.222  It must be acknowledged, however, that 
the frisk procedure created by Terry embodies the age-old attempt to balance 
the need for security with that of personal freedom.  In this context, “freedom” 
is not some malleable vision defined by the interested observer.  It is the con-
stitutionally guaranteed kind of freedom that, while not distinctly formed, is 
nevertheless not formless.  Following the guidance of the Terry opinion, at least 
some things can be said about frisks with a measure of confidence—or at least 
with clear textual support. 
To begin, Terry undoubtedly distinguishes between the two types of rea-
sonable suspicion it requires for detentions and frisks.223  Courts would do well 
to observe that distinction and rigorously examine each kind of suspicion sep-
arately before any frisk is approved.  There will be cases like Crain and Cas-
tleberry in which reasonable suspicion for a detention seems to have something, 
and perhaps a great deal, to do with whether the detained suspect is armed and 
dangerous.224  But blurring the line, even when genuine overlap exists, is ana-
lytically suspect and disserves courts, lawyers, and law enforcement officers 
trying to apply the Fourth Amendment consistently and correctly.  Evaluating 
“stop” and “frisk” separately, mindful of the different purposes that support 
each, best reinforces the protection from indiscriminate search that the Court 
created. 
For the same reasons, courts do well to avoid creating what amount to ex-
ceptions to the armed and dangerous requirement.  When a court announces that 
a certain kind of crime is so inherently likely to involve a weapon that even a 
total absence of objective evidence of danger is no impediment to frisk, it de-
taches the intrusion of the search from the very purpose that justifies it.  The 
Terry Court did not ignore or overlook the violent nature of some crimes.225  
The issue was raised in Terry itself by what Officer McFadden saw and sus-
 
222. Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas Officers 
Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://ny-
times.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RL3X-H4BU] (five po-
lice officers were killed and seven were wounded by lone gunman targeting the police); Erica Evans 
& Razzan Nakhlawi, It’s not just Dallas or Baton Rouge—police officers have been killed across the 
country, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-killings-20160713-
snap-story.html [https: perma.cc/P82A-S828] (chronicling killing of three police officers in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, bringing total of law enforcement officers killed to date in 2016 to thirty-one).  
223. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968). 
224. See supra Part III. 
225. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–34. 
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pected, that the men he was watching were about to commit a daytime rob-
bery.226  Justice Harlan proposed to his colleagues that such crimes automati-
cally warrant a frisk for the safety of the officer and others, and Justice White 
would have allowed a frisk in any case in which a suspect is detained.227  Nei-
ther of these views prevailed, though, and the requirement of an independent 
inquiry into dangerousness remains part of Terry.228  To be sure, it sometimes 
will be possible to reasonably infer from the nature of the crime that a suspect 
is likely to be armed and dangerous, but that likelihood should not, without 
further indications, suffice to warrant a search unless the inference is virtually 
inescapable, as in the case that an armed robbery is about to occur. 
It is simply too difficult to discern which crimes will necessarily involve 
weapons, and which will not.229  Drug offenses, for example, are not all of a 
kind.  Possession of a small quantity of a drug probably doesn’t indicate that 
the possessor is armed and dangerous, whereas possession of a much larger 
quantity of the same kind of drug increases the probability.230  But even drug 
traffickers often are not armed because commission of the crime does not re-
quire it.231  So, is drug dealing, by itself, a sufficient indicator that the dealer is 
armed?  It is no answer to cite statistics showing that sometimes drug deals 
involve armed participants, especially if those statistics also show that they usu-
ally do not.  The reality is that even the most innocent conduct may involve 
persons legally carrying weapons who pose no threat to police officers they 
encounter, and the most violent crimes may be committed by persons who are 
unarmed. 
The nature of the crime and the way in which it is usually committed may 
be factors in the calculus, but they should not be given undue weight.  Other 
circumstances, like location, actions of the suspect, the presence or absence of 
persons who might resist the crime, time of day, and many others, may be of 
equal or greater importance in gauging the threat from a suspect.232  As the 
 
226. Id. at 28. 
227. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
228. See id. at 27. 
229. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, §9.6(a), at 852–57 (explaining that for some crimes “the right 
to conduct a protective search must follow directly from the right to stop the suspect,” but many crimes 
require “other circumstances” than the nature of the crime in order to justify frisk). 
230. See State v. Wilkinson, 2009 UT App 202, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 97.  In State v. Wilkinson, the 
Utah appeals court observed: “‘[D]ealing in large quantities of narcotics’ is one example of a crime 
that would permit a frisk as a matter of routine based on its inherent nature. . . .  However, a mere 
allegation of drug use, possession, or small-scale distribution would not justify an automatic frisk.”  Id. 
(first alteration in original). 
231. See Harlow supra note 72, tbl.4.  
232. It is the combination of circumstances, and not any single factor, that produces the requisite 
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Terry Court observed: 
No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the 
street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case 
before us.  Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating 
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative 
sphere.  Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional 
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-
bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security 
without the objective evidentiary justification which the Con-
stitution requires.  When such conduct is identified, it must be 
condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded 
from evidence in criminal trials.233 
The “protean variety” that limits the scope of judicial mandate also pre-
cludes a bright-line determination that persons who commit certain crimes must 
be carrying weapons to do so.  Controlling the use of intrusive and embarrassing 
frisks—or “over-bearing or harassing” police conduct—begins with rigorous 
evaluation of what inferences can reasonably be drawn from all of the facts 
known to the officer, and not just a single factor in the equation. 
The opinion in Williams v. State234 may be seen as an aberration because 
the court so blatantly ignored the requirement that a reasonable belief of dan-
gerousness must precede a frisk.235  But the aberrant element may be only the 
honesty of the decision.236  When courts give little attention to testimony that 
 
reasonable suspicion.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 663 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1996) (“Neither evasive 
behavior, proximity to a crime scene, nor matching a general description is alone sufficient to support 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop and frisk.”). 
233. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
234. 27 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App. 2000). 
235. See id. at 694–95. 
236. Compare an Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in a case in which the police re-
ceived information from an informant that the defendant was attempting to buy drugs in an area where 
drug transactions occurred.  See Riddlesprigger v. State, 803 So. 2d 579, 580 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).  
Although there was no evidence that the suspect was armed and dangerous, he was frisked.  Id.  During 
that frisk, cocaine and marijuana were discovered inside the man’s baseball cap.  Id. at 580–81.  The 
defendant complained that the frisk exceeded the allowable scope of a cursory search for weapons, an 
argument the appeals court rejected following a discussion of whether a baseball cap could be “frisked” 
or patted-down due to its material and stiffness.  Id. at 583–84.  Nothing was said of any circumstance 
that would lead the officer to suspect the defendant was armed and dangerous in the first place, but the 
appeals court summarily approved the frisk, apparently on the grounds that the officer testified suspects 
sometimes hide razor blades in the lining of a cap.  See id. at 582.  The Alabama court’s opinion lacked 
the directness and honesty of the Williams opinion in that it either overlooked or deliberately ignored 
the absence of evidence that would have justified a frisk in the first place.  See id. at 584.  The only 
“evidence” on which the court expressly relied was testimony related to the prudence of searching hat 
bands, and not on whether drug buyers in general or the defendant in particular were likely to be armed.  
See id.  Obviously, nothing was said about the additional issue of whether a razor blade in a hat band 
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the officer did not believe the suspect to be armed, or when the only evidence 
supporting a belief that there is danger is ambiguous or dubious,237 they also 
ignore the requirement of Terry, but do so less forthrightly. 
As the court said in Williams, it is perhaps not unreasonable for an officer 
to routinely frisk a motorist stopped for a traffic violation.238  That judgment, 
however, has everything to do with prudence, and nothing to do with the degree 
to which objective fact supports a belief that the motorist is armed and danger-
ous.  It may be reasonable and prudent for a person to insure his house against 
loss, while at the same time there is no objective reason to believe the house is 
likely to be destroyed. 
If there were no counterbalance to prudence, no loss to be suffered by an-
other person, a routine frisk approach would be appropriate.  There is a coun-
terbalance, though, in the form of intrusion and loss of liberty to the person 
being frisked.  And this intrusion, while less than a full-blown search of the 
kind that accompanies arrest, is not inconsequential.  Consider a police-citizen 
encounter in which the officer asks for consent to search and consent is given.  
The request by the officer seems prudent, and the citizen can choose whether 
to give up Fourth Amendment protections and submit.  When a frisk is con-
ducted by a prudent officer who just wants to be sure the citizen isn’t armed, 
the “loss” to the citizen is constitutionally equivalent to the consent search but 
he or she was forced by the government agent to suffer it, and has no choice in 
the matter. 
Were prudence—the desire to reduce risk as much as possible—to be the 
only consideration, every police–citizen encounter would begin with a frisk, a 
real temptation for the police in contemporary American society.  As the First 
Circuit said in United States v. Villanueva,239 “With the plethora of gun carry-
ing, particularly by the young, we must have sympathy, to an extent, with police 
 
poses any practical threat to an armed officer engaged in a brief encounter, even if the suspect is car-
rying such a thing.  See id. 
237. Movements of the hand toward a pocket or waistband of the sort discussed in Griffin and 
Thompson, for example, by themselves tell an officer very little about whether a person may be armed 
unless surrounding circumstances support a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous.  See United 
States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Griffin v. State, 215 S.W.3d 403, 409 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
238. See Williams, 27 S.W.3d at 694; see also United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 629 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (despite lack of evidence that men in car were dangerous or involved in a violent crime, 
officer frisked driver). 
239. 15 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 1994).  The defendant in Villanueva was stopped initially because he 
and his companions were involved in disorderly conduct at a transit facility, conduct that did not in-
volve any indication of a weapon.  See id. at 198. 
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officers’ apprehensions.”240  But the court continued, “as there may be degrees 
of apprehension, so may there be degrees of invasion upon privacy.”241  But a 
police officer’s subjective apprehension or fear is not, and cannot be, the sole 
motivation for a frisk.242 
It is important when striking the proper balance between personal liberty 
and security to bear in mind that the level of intrusion for a pat-down may be 
diminished from that of a custodial arrest, but so too is the degree of suspicion 
required to justify it.  In an age in which so many law-abiding citizens may be 
carrying weapons legally, prudence, no matter how desirable, cannot trump the 
minimal privacy protections of Terry without imposing on an entire society yet 
one more burden for the actions of a relative few. 
For every frisk that uncovers a weapon or contraband, there may be hun-
dreds or even thousands that do not.  Unless those innocent persons seek legal 
or administrative redress for an unjustified search—and nearly none of them 
will—the exclusionary rule cannot serve its deterrence function, leaving the 
frisked persons essentially without redress, frustrated or contemptuous of the 
criminal justice system, and leaving the errant officers free to continue to frisk 
unimpeded by the requisite need for evidence-based suspicion.  As we think 
about the things we should fear, unfounded frisk must be added to that list. 
 
 
240. See id. at 199.  The appeals court in Williams v. State also observed that America is “awash 
in a sea of handguns.”  See Williams v. State, 27 S.W.3d 688, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
241. See Villanueva, 15 F.3d at 199. 
242. As Professor Wayne LaFave wrote: 
The police are frequently cautioned to assume that every person encountered may 
be armed, which is sound advice if it means only that the officer should remain 
alert in every case; but it cannot mean and has not been interpreted by the police 
to mean that a search for weapons may be undertaken in every case. 
LAFAVE, supra note 17, §9.6(a), at 852 (footnote omitted). 
